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PROPOSED FEDERAL IMMUNITY LEGISLATION
Two bills are pending in Congress which will have a consider-
able effect on the privilege against self-incrimination if they
become law. One of these bills would authorize the Attorney
General to compel self-incriminating testimony or documents
from any witness in any case or proceeding before any grand
jury or court of the United States whenever, in the judgment of
the Attorney General, such testimony is necessary to the public
interest. The witness, on the other hand, would not be subject to
any penalty or forfeiture for any testimony compelled of him
after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination.'
The other bill would give essentially the same power to either
House of Congress or committees of either or both Houses, with
respect to any witness appearing before either House or a com-
mittee of either or both Houses.2
The constitutional provision against self-incrimination as em-
bodied in the Fifth Amendment is no broader than the common
law privilege against self-incrimination, but this Amendment in-
sures the pirivilege against legislative abridgement.3 The con-
stitutionality of such legislation as that now proposed, however,
is well settled.4 The only real question presented is the desira-
bility of such immunity legislation. This question should be con-
sidered in view of the history of federal immunity legislation in
the United States.
In 1857 Congress passed an act which provided in part as
follows:
* * * [N]o person examined and testifying before either
House of Congress, or any committee of either House, shall
be held to answer criminally in any court of justice, or sub-
ject to any penitlty or forfeiture for any fact or act touching
which he shall be required to testify before either House of
Congress or any committee of either House . . . and that
no statement made or paper produced by any witness before
1. S. 565, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
2. S. 16, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
3. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (3d ed. 1940).
4. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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either House of Congress or before any committee of either
House, shall be competent testimony in any criminal pro-
ceeding against such witness. . . . [Emphasis added.]
This legislation was proposed by a select committee appointed by
the House of Representatives to investigate newspaper charges
of corruption among members of the House. The committee had
been obstructed in its investigation by a newspaper reporter's
refusal to disclose the source of his information for his charges
of corruption. The committee cited the reporter for contempt and
proposed the above act to compel more effectively the attendance
of witnesses and require their answers.6
The senatorial debate in 1862 on a proposed amendment to this
act of 1857 reveals the abuse which followed its passage and
which led to its change. Apparently a great many persons,
including the Secretary of War, immediately testified before
congressional committees to secure immunity for their wrong-
doings.7 Because of this, in 1862 the above quoted provision of
5. 11 STAT. 155 (1857).
6. CONG.-GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 403 (1857).
7. Senator Trumbull, arguing in favor of amendment, said:
. . The Senate is aware that one or two investigating committees
are in session; and that, under the law as it now stands, any person
who testifies before those committees in reference to any matter what-
ever is discharged from criminal prosecution for any offense that he may
have been guilty of, connected in any way with those transactions. It
was under this law that Floyd was discharged after he had been indicted,
and also the clerk in the Interior Department who purloined the Indian
bonds ...
•.. In fact this (the statute of 1857] holds out an inducement for the
worst criminals to appear before our investigating committees. Here is
a man who stole two millions in bonds, if you please, out of the Interior
Department. What does he do? He gets himself called as witness before
one of the investigating committees and testifies something in relation to
that matter, and then he cannot be indicted .... So it was with the
former Secretary of War; there were two or three indictments against
him in this District, but my information is that they were all quashed,
upon the ground that he also had testified before a Congressional com-
mittee.
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., 428 (1862).
Senator Wade, also arguing in favor of amendment, said:
. I have not dared to enter upon certain investigations before a
committee of which I am a member, for the reason that the law as it
now stands exculpates great rascals from the responsibility they owe to
the Government, and gives entire immunity to any man touching any
matter that you see fit to inquire of him about. I wonder how such a
law was ever passed. I never should have believed that such a law
was on your statute-book if it had not been suggested to me and I had
found it. ...
Id. at 429. Senator Harris argued against the proposed amendment, and
although he mistakenly assumed that the proposed amendment would be a
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the 1857 act was abolished, and it was provided in lieu thereof
as follows:
... [T] he testimony of a witness examined and testifying
before either House of Congress, or any committee of either
House of Congress, shall not be used as evidence in any
criminal proceeding against such witness in any court of
justice. . . . [Emphasis added.]
The validity of this type of legislation was tested in Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock,9 where the statute involved was in substance
almost identical to the above quoted 1862 amendment except that
it dealt with evidence obtained in a judicial proceeding instead
of a congressional hearing.10 The Court, holding that statute
invalid as a means of compelling self-incriminating testimony,
said:
We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the
party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the
criminating question put to him, can have the effect of sup-
planting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the
United States. Section 860 of the Revised Statutes does not
supply a complete protection from all the perils against
which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard,
and is not a full substitute for that prohibition. In view of
the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be
valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecu-
tion for the offence to which the question relates. . . Sec-
tion 860, moreover, affords no protection against that use of
compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a
knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources of in-
formation which may supply other means of convicting the
witness or party.'1
constitutionally effective immunity statute to compel testimony, he spoke
prophetically when he said:
... It is not enough to say that the testimony of a witness shall not
afterwards be used against him on a criminal prosecution.... Now, the
effect of passing the bill in its present shape will be this: a witness may
be put upon the stand; he may be compelled to answer questions, and
the answer to thoie questions may be such as to furnish the means by
which he can afterwards be convicted of a crime. I am not willing to
make this great innovation upon the common-law doctrine of evidence....
Id. at 428.
8. 12 STAT. 333 (1862).
9. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
10. REv. STAT. § 860 (1875):
No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained from
a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding in this or any
foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used
against him or his property or estate, in any court of the United States,
in any criminal proceeding, or for the enforcement of any penalty or
forfeiture. . . .
11. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
This case thus set forth the pattern for future immunity statutes,
the test being whether the immunity granted is as broad as the
privilege being abrogated. If the immunity is coextensive with
the privilege against self-incrimination, then the statute is valid,
and if it is not coextensive with the privilege the statute is in-
effective to compel otherwise privileged testimony.
It should be noted that the decision in the Counselman case
did not render the provision there involved or the similar 1862
amendment invalid per se, but rather it rendered these statutes
ineffective to compel privileged testimony. These statutes were
still effective to prevent testimony given in a congressional hear-
ing or judicial proceeding from being used as evidence in a later
prosecution even though the testimony or evidence was never
privileged. Thus as a practical matter, these statutes remained
on the books and gave unwarranted protection to witnesses later
prosecuted although they were of no use to compel testimony or
evidence. It was for this very reason that the statute involved in
the Counselman case was repealed in 1910,12 but the 1862 amend-
ment has never been repealed and is still law today.13
Shortly after the Counselman case an immunity statute14 deal-
ing with witnesses appearing before the Interstate Commerce
Commission was upheld in Brown v. Walker." This statute,
which provided that "no person shall be prosecuted or subjected
to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise . ..,"6 met the require-
ments of the Counselman case. In the Brown case the Court said
that there are two possible interpretations of the Fifth Amend-
ment: first, a literal interpretation that no one could be com-
pelled to testify as to anything against his will unless it was ob-
viously not incriminating or degrading, or second, that the object
of the Fifth Amendment is to secure a witness against criminal
prosecution. The Court adopted the second interpretation, from
12. 36 STAT. 352 (1910).
Since the decision above referred to [Counselman v. Hitchcock) sec-
tion 860 has possessed no usefulness whatever, but has remained in the
law as an impediment to the course of justice. . . . The statute has
become a shield to the criminal and an obstruction to justice.
H. R. REP. No. 266, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910).
13. 12 STAT. 333 (1862), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp. 1952).
14. 27 STAT. 443 (1893).
15. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
16. 27 STAT. 443 (1893).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss3/4
IMMUNITY LEGISLATION
which it follows that if the statute prevents future prosecution,
then the privileged testimony can be compelled.
With this history in the background the basic question of the
desirability of the proposed immunity legislation can be consid-
ered. The Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in
Interstate Commerce reported that "[t] he most glaring weakness,
which proved highly embarrassing to the committee and continu-
ously frustrated its investigations, was the defect in the immunity
statute governing Congressional investigations .... 17 The com-
mittee strongly endorsed the passage of the proposed bill which
compels testimony at congressional hearings.18 This bill has also
been reported on favorably by the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. 19 The other bill,20 which gives power to the Attorney
General to compel testimony at his discretion in judicial pro-
ceedings, was proposed by Senator Kefauver and has been
strongly endorsed by Judge Morris Ploscowe.21
What will be the effect of the passage of the proposed legisla-
tion? Will there again be such abuse of the powers created as
there was following the first immunity statute in 1857?
It is submitted that probably the greater part of the corruption
and misuse following the passage of the 1857 statute was due to
the poor draftsmanship of that statute. A comparison of the
pertinent part of the 1857 statute with its modern counterpart,
which would compel testimony in congressional hearings, shows
that the 1857 statute did not require any claim of privilege by
the witness, nor did it impose any limitations upon the granting
of immunity and its coincident compulsion of testimony.22 A
17. SEN. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1951). (Final Report of
the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Com-
merce.) The statute criticized by the committee is 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp.
1952) which is essentially the 1862 amendment.
18. S. 16, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
19. SEN. RE. No. 153, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
20. S. 565, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). This bill was proposed by Sena-
tor Kefauver for himself, Senator Hunt, Senator Tobey, and Senator Wiley.
21. Ploscowe, How to Make Gangsters Talk, This Week Magazine, Feb.
1, 1953, p. 7. Judge Ploscowe is Eexcutive Director of the American Bar
Association's Commission on Organized Crime. He helped prepare the final
report of the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Inter-
state Commerce.
22. 11 STAT. 155 (1857):
• . . [N]o person examined and testifying before either House of
Congress, or'any committee of either House, shall be held to answer
criminally in any court of justice, or subject to any penalty or forfeiture
for any fact or act touching which he shall be required to testify before
either House of Congress or any committee of either House as to which
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workable statute of this type needs those two requirements.
When a claim of privilege is not required, the examiner never
knows when his questions would compel self-incriminating an-
swers. This does not pregent a problem in the absence of im-
munity statutes since if a witness does not claim his privilege
he is deemed to have waived it by answering the question.23 Un-
der the 1857 immunity statute, however, the privilege was not
waived. Instead the witness gained immunity from further
prosecution! Then too, under the 1857 statute there was no re-
quirement that a majority of the House or a certain majority of
the committee conducting the hearing vote to grant immunity to
compel testimony. Thus even after the examiner became aware
that a witness was giving self-incriminating testimony he could
continue his questioning and completely immunize the witness
unless stopped by the body conducting the hearing.
This type of abuse and misuse is not possible under the pro-
he shall have testified whether before or after the date of this act, and
that no statement made or paper produced by any witness before either
House of Congress or before any committee of either House, shall be
competent testimony in any criminal proceeding against such witness
in any court of justice; ... Provided, That nothing in this act shall be
construed to exempt any witness from prosecution and punishment for
perjury committed by him in testifying as aforesaid.
S. 16, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953):
"No witness shall be excused from testifying or from producing books,
papers and other records and documents before either House, or before
any committee of either House, or before any joint committee of the two
Houses of Congress on the ground, or for the reason, that the testimony
or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required 9f him tend to incrimi-
nate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, when the record
shows -
(1) in the case of proceedings before one of the Houses of Congress,
that a majority of the Members present of that House, or
(2) in the case of proceedings before a committee, that two-thirds
of the members of the full committee, including at least one member
of each of the two political parties having the largest representation
on such committee.
shall by affirmative vote have authorized that such person be granted
immunity under this section with respect to the transactions, matters, or
things concerning which, after he has claimed his privilege against self-
incrimination, he is nevertheless compelled by direction of the presiding
officer or the chair to testify. But no such witness shall be prosecuted
or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any trans-
action, matter, or thing concerning which after he has claimed his privi-
lege against self-incrimination he is nevertheless so compelled to testify,
or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise.
"No official paper or record required to be produced hereunder is within
the said privilege.
"No person shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for perjury
or contempt committed in so testifying."
23. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927);
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENOE § 2276 (3d ed. 1940).
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posed statute. It is specifically provided that there must be a
claim of privilege by the witness. 24 In the absence of such a
claim all privilege is waived as to answers given by the witness,
and no immunity is gained.25 When the witness does claim his
privilege against self-incrimination, it is then within the discre-
tion of the body conducting the hearing to grant immunity and
compel the desired testimony. 6 If a House of Congress is con-
ducting the hearing, a majority of the members of that House
present must vote to grant immunity, and if a congressional com-
mittee is conducting the hearing, two-thirds of the members of
that committee, including at least one member of each of the two
major political parties, must vote in favor of granting immunity.
To clarify matters and prevent any possible confusion or am-
biguity the proposed statute also provides that official papers or
records are not within the immunity grant, nor is a person ex-
empt from a prosecution for contempt or perjury committed
while so testifying.27
One feature not present in the proposed statute is a require-
ment that the congressional body questioning the witness either
receive the approval of the Attorney General prior to granting
immunity to a witness or at least consult with the Attorney Gen-
enral. This may or may not be considered a defect in the proposed
statute, but such a requirement would appear to have some merit
since the Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer
of the Federal Government. As such, he should have a much
more complete picture of crime in the United States and of law
enforcement in general than the congressional body involved.
Requiring such approval or consultation would tend to insure
harmony and coordination between the work of the Justice De-
partment and that of Congress.
The other proposed bill authorizes the Attorney General to
grant immunity to a witness in any proceeding in any grand jury
or court of the United States whenever he thinks that it is neces-
sary to the public interest.2 The structure of this act is basically
24. See note 22 supra
25. 8 WIGMORE, EViDNcE § 2276 (3d ed. 1940).
26. See note 22 supra.
27. Ibid. 1
28. S. 565, 83d Cong., 1st Sees. (1953):
... That section 8486 of chapter 223 of title 18 of the United States
Code is amended by striking out the caption thereof and inserting the
following: "§ 3486. Compelled testimony tending to incriminate wit-
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the same as that of the other proposed measure. The witness
must claim his privilege against self-incrimination and then be
compelled to testify before he receives any immunity. As in the
other bill it is provided fhat no witness will be exempt from
prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while so testify-
ing. It is also provided, as an additional safeguard, that when
in the Attorney General's judgment the witness's testimony is
necessary to the public interest, this decision shall be in writing,
signed by the Attorney General, and become a part of the record
of the proceeding or case of which the testimony is a part.
Granted that the apparent defects of the 1857 statute are
rectified in both of the proposed bills, the fact still remains that
this tremendous power to immunize criminals would be placed
in the hands of the Congress and the Attorney. General and it
may possibly be abused. Although this argument may be made,
the answer is, of course, that the Congress and the Attorney
General are subject to the will of the people, and there is not apt
to be any more abuse of this power than of the many other sweep-
ing powers which Congress and the Attorney General have.
Another and probably more valid argument against this type
nesses; immunity," and by inserting "(a)" at the beginning of the text
thereof and adding thereafter the following:
"(b) Whenever in the judgment of the Attorney General the testi-
mony of any witness, or the production of books, papers, or other records
or documents by any witness, in any case or proceeding before any grand
jury or court of the United States is necessary to the public interest,
such witness shall not be excused from testifying or from producing
books, papers, and other records and documents on the ground that the
testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but such
witness shall not be prosecuted or subject to any penalty or forfeiture
for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which
he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except
that such witness so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution
and punishment for perjury or contempt committed in so testifying.
"(c) The judgment of the Attorney General that any testimony, or
the production of any books, papers, or other records or documents, is
necessary to the public interest shall be confirmed in a written commu-
nication over the signature of the Attorney General addressed to the
grand jury or court of the United States concerned, and shall be made
a part of the record of the case or proceeding in which such testimony
or evidence is given."
This bill as it now stands would leave still in effect 18 U.S.C. § 3486
(Supp. 1952) which is basically the 1862 act. This section should be re-
pealed because just like Rev. STAT. § 860 (1875), which was repealed (36
STAT. 352 (1910)), it is of no use in compelling testimony or evidence and
hinders future prosecutions. See note 12 supra, and the text supported
thereby.
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of legislation should be carefully considered, however. The privi-
lege against self-incrimination is constitutionally guaranteed,
and although there has been some adverse criticism of that
privilege, -'9 it has become not only a very important part of our
law but also a kind of national concept or creed. It should be
pointed out that if this proposed legislation is passed it will im-
pair the privilege. That is because it has been well settled, since
United States v. Murdock," that a witness in a federal proceed-
ing cannot claim the privilege against self-incrimination on the
grounds that his answers will incriminate him under state law.3 1
This means that a witness may be compelled to answer questions
pertinent to the federal proceeding which may provide informa-
tion for a subsequent state prosecution. This situation has led
one federal judge to say in a recent case:
*.. The doctrine [of the Murdock case] is so strongly en-
trenched that it appears as futile to protest as it is to expect
an individual to feel that his constitutional privilege has been
safeguarded because the penitentiary into which his answer
may land him is under the supervision of the state instead
of the federal government22
Furthermore, it is well settled that for a federal immunity statute
to be valid it need not provide immunity from state prosecution
but that full immunity from federal prosecution is all that is
required.-
From a superficial consideration of these rulings, it can be
argued that the proposed immunity legislation is not an in-
fringement on the privilege against self-incrimination in the
sense of opening the door to subsequent state prosecutions. In
theory this may be true, but as a practical matter the argument
is doubtful. The rule of the Murdock case is a definite abridge-
29. 5 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICLL EVIDENCE 207-283 (1827).
30. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
31. Camarota v. United States, 111 F.2d 243 (3rd Cir. 1940); Graham
v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Circ. 1938); In re Friedman, 104 F.
Supp. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); cf. United States v. Forrester, 105 F. Supp. 136(N.D. Ga. 1952); see Miller v. United States, 95 F.2d 492, 493 (9th Cir.
1938).
32. Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 1952).
33. Nelson v. United States, 201 U.S. 92 (1906); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906). This is likewise true for a state immunity statute. Feld-
man v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372(1905). In Brawn v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), the majority of the
Court construed the statute in question as prohibiting subsequent state pros-
ecution, and the decision of the Court may be based on this construction of
the statute. Apparently none of the later cases have followed Brown v.
Walker in this respect.
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ment of the privilege against self-incrimination and the proposed
immunity legislation would further abridge that privilege in the
sense that it would increase the area in which a subsequent state
prosecution is possible. Then too, and this is a more serious
objection, the rule of the Murdock case will quite often not apply
since in many cases that which is a crime in a state is also a
violation of some federal criminal law and the witness can claim
his privilege against self-incrimination.- Under an immunity
statute in this same situation, however, the witness would be
compelled to testify and a subsequent state prosecution could
follow.
Another phase of this problem is presented with respect to
Communism. Barsky v. United States3 1 held that the First
Amendment does not prohibit a congressional inquiry into a wit-
ness's Communist affiliations, but the privilege against self-
crimination does protect a witness from such an inquiry.3 If
the proposed immunity statutes become law, such information
could be compelled and the witness could be subjected to prosecu-
tion in the many states which have statutes similar to the Smith
Act.37
These arguments against the proposed legislation should be
considered in light of the evils-organized crime and Communism
-which the proposed legislation is designed to combat. Such
measures have been deemed an effective tool for combatting
these evils. They would enable investigatory bodies to compel
testimony from known criminals and Communists in order to
learn of their organizations and unknown leaders. Like most
policy questions it is not a black or white proposition. It is "bal-
ancing" in the truest sense of the word. All that can be asked is
that the decision be the result of a thorough consideration of all
the facts, probabilities and possibilities involved.
GEORGE A. JENSEN
34. See Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952).
35. 167 F.2d. 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
36. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950) ; United States v. Jaffe, 98
F. Supp. 191 (D.D.C. 1951); United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491
(D.D.C. 1951).
37. For a collection of the state acts, see GELHoRN, THE STATES AND
SuBVERsIoN app. A, B (1st ed. 1952).
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